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Abstract
We develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing
and quality allocation (PPQ), whereby rms charge di¤erent prices and o¤er di¤erent qualities to di¤erent
consumers, based on their willingness to pay. We embed PPQ in a model of spatial di¤erentiation, and
show how information about consumer preferences a¤ects multi-product rmschoices over pricing schedules
and product line o¤erings. We show that consumer surplus with PPQ will be non-monotonic in consumer
valuations. Our model sheds light on the di¤erent product quality schedules o¤ered by rms, given that
one or both rms implement PPQ. Contrary to prior literature on one-to-one marketing, we show that even
symmetric rms can avoid the well-known Prisoners Dilemma problem due to the quality enhancement
e¤ect at the individual consumer level. The rent extraction e¤ect due to quality enhancement dominates the
adverse e¤ect of price competition. Moreover, this result is stronger when rms have a larger proportion of
loyal consumers. When both rms have PPQ, consumer surplus is non-monotonic in valuations such that
some low valuation consumers get higher surplus than high valuation consumers. We extend our analysis
to asymmetric rms and show that when one rm adopts PPQ, it always increases its quality level while
the other rm keeps its quality schedule unchanged compared to the case when neither rm has PPQ. We
demonstrate that a rm with an ex-ante, smaller loyal segment can be better o¤ with PPQ.
Keywords: Competitive strategy, Personalized pricing, Non-linear pricing, Price discrimination, Quality
design, Customer Relationship Management.
1We thank Yuxin Chen, Roy Radner, Uday Rajan, participants at the 2005 Workshop on Customer Relationship
Management, 2005 Workshop on Economics and Information Systems (WISE 2005), the 2006 International Indus-
trial Organization Conference, and seminar participants at Drexel University and New York University for helpful
comments.
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1 Introduction
Personalized pricing has often been dened as gauging a shoppers desire, measuring his means,
and then charging accordingly. This requires knowledge of each consumers preferences and an
ability to charge di¤erent prices to di¤erent consumers. The price o¤ered to a consumer whose
valuation for a product or service is known may be higher or lower than the posted uniform price
charged by rms who lack the sophistication to target individual consumers. Various technologies
exist today that allow rms to identify and track individual customers. This leads to the creation
of consumer proles, matching of consumer identities with relevant demographic information, and
comparison with the preferences of similar customers through various collaborative and content
ltering techniques. Based on such information, rms deploy algorithms to determine prices that
approach rst degree price discrimination.
There are several examples of personalized pricing. These include major providers of long
distance telephone service (such as AT&T, MCI and Sprint), mail order companies like Lands End
and L.L. Bean, who have individual specic catalog prices, the online data provider Lexis-Nexis,
which sells to virtually every user at a di¤erent price (Shapiro and Varian 1999), and rms in
nancial services and banking such as Wells Fargo and MBNA, who engage in individualized pricing
through personalized discounts on card fees (Zhang 2003).
Similarly, there are examples of personalized quality or services too. In the context of customer
service, rms often render a personalized services to customers based on their proles. It is common
in the nancial services industry to provide a di¤erentiated service to customers based on their
net worth, which is a good proxy for willingness to pay. For example, when a call comes into
a call-center, the customers prole pops up on the service representatives screen and the call
is addressed accordingly. Retailers like Lands End and L.L. Bean are also well known for using
such relationship management technologies for delivering personalized customer service. This is
increasingly becoming common in the hotel industry wherein hotels personalize the frills provided
to customers based on their proles (Bailor 2005). The market for computer servers, storage devices
and workstations combines personalized pricing and targeted quality allocation. Major rms such as
IBM, Hewlett Packard, and Sun Microsystems use personalized discounting for di¤erent customers.
PC vendors like Dell o¤er computers of varying congurations to customers, which di¤er in their
speed and performance due to the presence of di¤erent processors and memory modules. In the
enterprise software applications market, there is also a trend towards customizing the product to
suit clientsneeds as well as o¤ering a personalized level of service quality through the use of one-to-
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one repair schedules and uptime guarantees. Consumers can either select a brand with a particular
conguration themselves, or a rms sales representative can recommend a specic product based on
their interactions with consumers. Similarly, it is quite common for consumers to choose extended
warranties or delivery options from a menu of choices, either by themselves or based on a specic
recommendation by sales representatives.2
Many rms believe that the concept of making the right o¤er (price and quality) to the right
customer would be the way of the future. Hence, they are investing in technologies and processes
which enable the use of consumer information to tailor prices and services. In this paper, we use the
term personalized pricing and quality, or PPQ, to refer to the case in which a rm can implement
a pricing policy and o¤er a quality schedule based on complete knowledge of the willingness to
pay of each consumer. Since, the amount of information required for implementing PPQ is high,
in practice rms may not know valuations precisely. Hence, our results should be interpreted as
the solution to an important limiting case which provides a useful benchmark the case of perfect
information. Hence, we ignore the possibility of mistargeting, which results, for example, when a
rm mistakenly perceives some price-sensitive customers as price-insensitive and charges them high
prices.3 We examine the following questions:
(i) How does the presence of technologies which facilitate PPQ, a¤ect equilibrium price and qual-
ity schedules? (ii) when do rms competing on the quality of value-added services benet from
personalized pricing and quality design, and how does this depend on rm size? (iii) what are the
incentives for competing rms to adopt such technologies, and (iv) how is consumer surplus and
overall social welfare a¤ected by the adoption of PPQ technologies?
1.1 Prior Literature
A number of recent papers (Sha¤er and Zhang 1995, Bester and Petrakis 1996, Fudenberg and
Tirole 2000), have shown that when rms o¤er one-to-one promotions or other forms of customized
pricing, it generally leads to a Prisoners Dilemma which leaves all rms worse-o¤ compared to the
scenario when they do not o¤er customized pricing. These papers are based on ex-ante symmetric
rms. Corts (1998) and Sha¤er and Zhang (2000) nd that targeted promotions need not necessarily
2Other examples are also found in nancial services industry. Consider a consumer who wants to buy a nancial
product or service from her favorite nancial rm. There are situations in which the consumer is not exactly aware
of the precise features that she wants for the nancial product or service. She walks into the nancial institution,
and talks to a sales representative. The sales representative based on the customer interaction process and other
information sources (such as purchase history of the customer) recommends a specic product at a specic price.
3Chen, Narasimhan & Zhang (2001), have shown that mistargeting can have an important e¤ect. It softens
price competition in the market, and qualitatively changes the incentives for competing rms engaged in individual
marketing. Liu and Serfes (2004) also consider imperfect information in a spatial price discrimination model and nd
that when the quality of information is low, rms unilaterally commit not to price discriminate.
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lead to a Prisoners Dilemma. However, they allow for at most one promotional price by symmetric
rms, and their result accrues due to an alleviation of price competition. A closely related paper is
that by Sha¤er and Zhang (2002) who consider perfect price discrimination by competing rms in
a model that includes both horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation, with a positive cost of targeting
customers. They are the rst to show that a Prisoners Dilemma can be avoided with one-to-one
promotions but only with asymmetric rms (when rms are dissimilar in market size, ex-ante).
We show that even symmetric rms are better o¤ when they engage in one-to-one pricing
and product allocations, and can thus avoid the Prisoners Dilemma. In our model, this result
arises because of the quality enhancement e¤ect from o¤ering a continuum of qualities in the
market. With PPQ, rms can provide higher qualities to each consumer without the fear of intra-
rm product cannibalization which occurs in situations with self-selection. This occurs because
PPQ enables a rm to allocate a pair of price and quality to each individual consumer. This kind
of targeting leads to a higher rent extraction ability for each rm. This e¤ect o¤sets the price
competition e¤ect and makes it protable for symmetric rms to engage in PPQ. Moreover, in
contrast to Sha¤er and Zhang (2002) we show that when rms are asymmetric in size, even the
smaller rm can gain when both rms adopt PPQ.
Recent work on customer recognition and behavior-based price discrimination includes Villas-
Boas (1999, 2004) and Acquisti and Varian (2005). Much of the recent work on perfect price
discrimination has been done either in the context of horizontal product di¤erentiation (Thisse
and Vives 1988, Sha¤er and Zhang 1995, Chen and Iyer 2002, Bhaskar and To 2004, Liu and
Serfes 2004). In the context of channel management, Liu and Zhang (2005) analyze the benet
of personalized pricing for a retailer.4 Our paper is also related to the work of Choudhary et al.,
(2005) who look at the impact of personalized pricing in a vertically di¤erentiated duopoly setting
with each rm o¤ering a single quality. Our model is di¤erent since we incorporate a continuum of
qualities and prices, and rms are able to customize both prices and qualities. Moreover, we also
explicitly analyze the incentives that rms have for adopting PPQ, when adopting PPQ entails
some xed costs.
Our work is also related to the emerging stream of research on product customization which
shows that rms should not make symmetric investments in product customization technology
(Dewan et al. 2003, Bernhardt et al. 2005). Syam et al. (2005) show that rms nd it protable to
customize only one of a products two attributes and each rm chooses the same attribute. Syam
and Kumar (2005) show that customization helps rms increase the prices of the standard products
4For a detailed survey of work related to one-to-one marketing, see Murthi and Sarkar (2003).
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as well thereby leading to higher prots. They also nd conditions under which ex-ante symmetric
rms will adopt asymmetric strategies.5
A common theme in the customization literature is that rms can customize their product to
eliminate product di¤erentiation, which leads to erce price competition. Further these papers also
di¤er based on whether rms customize prices or not. Our work is di¤erent from all of these papers
because rms in our model do not make decisions between o¤ering standardized vs. customized
products. They always produce the same number of products, i.e. the length of the product line
is xed. What changes with PPQ technology is the level of quality o¤ered to each consumer,
and the corresponding price charged. Basically, rms can choose to decide whether they allow
consumers to self-select from the (price, quality) menu or whether they target each consumer with
a specic (price, quality) o¤er. This ensures that even though rms know individual customer
types, there still exists su¢ cient product di¤erentiation. More importantly, unlike prior work, our
paper combines both personalized pricing and one-to-one quality allocation in the same theoretical
framework.
1.2 Overview of Results
We highlight a number of ndings. First, in a duopoly setting, we characterize rmsoptimal price
and quality schedules, as well as consumer surplus and social welfare, when, neither rm, one rm
or both rms have PPQ. Second, in contrast to prior work, we show that quality enhancement
through the allocation of a targeted quality schedule to each consumer results in less aggravated
price competition by strengthening the opportunities for rent extraction. Thus, the adoption of
PPQ technologies by competing rms can make even symmetric (or identical) rms better-o¤.6
Even after explicitly accounting for the costs of PPQ, we nd regions where symmetric rms are
better-o¤ after adopting PPQ. This can have important managerial implications for rms which
practice one-to-one marketing and are considering making investments in CRM technologies.
Third, we show that the adoption of PPQ by both rms has a di¤erential impact on average
consumer surplus as well as on the surplus accruing to a consumer at a given location. While
the adoption of PPQ results in a lower average consumer surplus, interestingly, we nd that some
consumers are actually better o¤ when both rms adopt PPQ. In particular, consumers located
closer to the middle of the marketwho are the least loyal to either rm or are the least likely to
5Other related work includes Alptekinoglu and Corbett (2004).
6 It is useful to point out that in an equivalent Hotelling setup with uniform distribution of consumer valuations
and no quality choice, rm prots with personalized pricing are the same as those with uniform pricing. This occurs
because in the absence of targeted product allocations, the rent extraction e¤ect is very minimal, unlike in our model.
Proof of this is available from the authors upon request.
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buy from either rm, are the ones who are the most better-o¤ (in terms of their surplus) when both
rms adopt PPQ technologies. Intuitively, in the absence of PPQ, its important for rms to leave
some information rents for their most loyal (higher valuation) consumers so that it can prevent
cannibalization. This leads to positive surplus for the higher valuation consumers. However, with
PPQ there is no potential for such cannibalization and as a result, rms do not need to leave any
information rents for consumers. Consequently, these loyal consumers are left with no surplus.
Finally, we consider asymmetric rms (in market size) and show that, compared to the No-
PPQ scenario, when one rm adopts PPQ, it always increases its quality level while the other
rm keeps its quality schedule unchanged. Conversely, compared to the Both-PPQ scenario, when
a rm drops PPQ, it always decreases its quality schedule while the other rm keeps its quality
schedule unchanged. For a wide range of cost parameters, we further demonstrate some results
on the protability of adopting PPQ. An interesting result is the emergence of an asymmetric
equilibrium: situation where one rm adopts PPQ and the other rm does not despite both rms
being symmetric in the size of their loyal segments. This occurs because in some cases, once a
rm adopts PPQ, its rivals benet from adopting it does not outweigh its costs. We also nd
that starting from asymmetric rms (in the size of their loyal customer segments) when rms
progressively become symmetric, the adoption of PPQ technologies increasingly becomes benecial
to both rms. The rent extraction e¤ect due to quality enhancement dominates the adverse e¤ect of
price competition and this result is stronger when rms have a larger proportion of loyal consumers.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model in detail. Section 3 presents
the three scenarios wherein neither rm, one rm or both rms can have PPQ. We then proceed
to Section 4 to discuss the impact of PPQ on prices, consumer surplus, social welfare and prots.
Section 5 consists of extensions in which we demonstrate the impact of PPQ on asymmetric rms,
and provide some observations on the incentive of rms to adopt PPQ with the help of numer-
ical analysis. Managerial implications of our ndings are presented in Section 6. Due to space
limitations, all proofs have been relegated to the Supplementary Appendix.
2 Model
We consider personalized pricing and quality design in a duopoly model. Two multi-product rms
compete in both the quality and price of the products they o¤er. Each rms product line consists
of a continuum of qualities, as in prior literature (Mussa and Rosen 1978). In this framework, a
rms focus is on the choice of price as a function of quality rather than the choice of quality levels
itself. This is because the implicit assumption in such models is that a rms product line length
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is xed: all possible quality levels are produced by rms.
When neither rm has access to PPQ, prices are chosen simultaneously by both rms. When
only one rm has access to PPQ, the rm without PPQ chooses its price rst. After observing
this rm, the rm with access to PPQ sets a menu of prices. This setting is widely adopted in the
literature (see for example, Thisse and Vives 1988, Choudhary et al. 2005, Liu and Zhang 2006).
When both rms have PPQ, the order of moves at stage 2 does not a¤ect the outcome; we again
posit that prices are chosen simultaneously. Once prices are chosen, at the last stage of the game
(stage 3), consumers decide which, if any, product to buy.7
These two rms locate at the two ends of a straight line from 0 to 1, o¤ering a continuum
of products di¤erentiated in quality. The rm located at the left is denoted as rm L while that
located on the right is denoted as rm R. Consumer types are denoted by the parameter  where
 2 [0; 1] with a uniform distribution. A consumer has positive utility for one unit only. The type
parameter  indicates a consumers marginal valuation for quality. If either of the two products
o¤ers a positive net utility, the consumer buys the one that maximizes their surplus. Otherwise,
they choose not to buy any product. The utility to a consumer with type  buying from the rm
located at 0, rm L, is
uL(q; ) = q  (1  );
while his utility in buying from the rm located at 1, rm R, is
uR(q; ) = q  :
Thus, for a given consumer,  is analogous to a transportation costof buying from rm L and
1   is analogous to a transportation costof buying from rm R. This is a very common setup
in the non-linear pricing literature (Spulber 1989, Stole 1995) and is quite intuitive. The term,
q or (1   )q; can be regarded as the quality weighted transportation costs that is common in
models with a horizontally di¤erentiated market. This setup maps with a scenario wherein two
rms sell branded products and have groups of brand loyal customers. Typical examples are found
in the fashion industry, apparel, jewelry, computers, luxury cars, etc. In these industries, brand
preferences and product quality are often fused together in consumers willingness-to-pay (WTP).
Basically a simple interpretation of our model is a market in which there are customers who have
7Note that with PPQ each consumer receives a single (price, quality) o¤ering from the rm in accordance with
their types. Hence, its not critical for consumers to observe the menu before purchase in scenarios with PPQ. In
contrast, when a rm does not have PPQ, a consumer can choose any pair from a menu of prices and qualities. In
this case consumers do need to observe the menu of prices and qualities. This is feasible and common in practice too.
For example, using sources on the Internet, or direct mail order catalogs consumers can observe the di¤erent prices
rms charge for di¤erent possible congurations of the product.
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very high marginal WTP for quality for the products of one rm but not for products of the other
rm. For example, customers who like Microsofts products may not like Apples products because
their inherent preferences for these brands are very di¤erent. Moreover, this setup also captures
the fact that customers who do not have loyalty towards any particular brand, have a low marginal
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for either brand. Thus, the intensity of a consumers preference for a rm
is inversely proportional to the distance between a consumer and the rm; the consumer located
at 0 values rm L the most while the consumer located at 1 values R the most.
Without PPQ, rms are unable to observe each consumers most preferred product. However,
they know the distribution of consumer preferences. In the case of PPQ, we allow one or both rms
to be equipped with a technology that perfectly reveals the consumers type before a given price
and a given quality is o¤ered to the consumer. Both rms know which rm has PPQ before the
game is played. In practice, implementing PPQ may well require some xed costs. However, if such
costs are independent of the quality of the product being o¤ered by the rm, they do not a¤ect the
qualitative nature of the results. For simplicity, we treat these costs as zero.8 We consider pure
strategy Nash equilibria of this game.
Consistent with the prior literature, we assume that rms have a marginal cost of production
which is invariant with the quantity, but depends on the quality of the product (Moorthy 1988).
That is, both rms have the same cost function, but depending on the quality schedules they choose,
their marginal costs may di¤er in equilibrium. Each rm has a constant marginal cost for producing
the good, denoted by c. Further c() is twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex
in q. That is, c0(q) > 0 and c00(q) > 0. For analytical tractability in solving the general model and
to highlight the impact of the cost function on di¤erent decision variables, we use the following
function: c(q) = q=: This function satises all of the above properties for  > 1.
3 Competition with or without PPQ
3.1 Neither rm has PPQ
First, we consider the benchmark case when neither rm has access to PPQ (we call this the No-
PPQ case). Basically each rm o¤ers a menu of prices, p(q), for all consumer types . The decision
variable p(q) of the rm can be equivalently written as q() and p() since each consumer will
self-select the contract designed for his type in equilibrium.9
8 In Section 5.2, we provide guidelines as to when rms should or should not invest in PPQ if the xed costs of
investing in PPQ are non-zero.
9Rather than considering all possible pricing functions, the revelation principle ensures that the rm can restrict
its attention to direct mechanisms that is, contracts in which one specic quality-price pair is designed for each
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As shown by Spulber (1989), in equilibrium, each rm occupies half of the market. Basically,
the equilibrium pricing menu is similar to that of Mussa and Rosen (1978) since both rms compete
by lowering the price by a constant while keeping the quality schedule at the same level. We use
superscripts to denote the variables of rm R or L. Let LN and 
R
N denote the prot of rm L and
rm R, respectively in the No-PPQ case. Let s() denote the surplus function.
The objective function of rm R is given by
max
pR(); qR()
RN ; where 
R
N =
Z 1
B

pR()  (q
R) ()


d; (1)
subject to the following constraints:
 (IC): Each consumer of type  chooses the qR() and pR() that the seller designed for him.
 = arg maxt   qR(t)  pR(t); 8 2 [0; 1]:
 (IR1): Each consumer of type  receives a utility level that is higher than 0. sR ()  0:
 (IR2): The marginal consumer B gets the same surplus from each rm and hence, is indif-
ferent between buying from rm R and rm L. That is, sR(B) = sL(B):
Intuitively, the IC constraint ensures that a consumer prefers the contract that was designed
for him, and the IR constraint guarantees that each consumer accepts his designated contract.
Firms set a quality schedule q() and compete for the marginal consumer by o¤ering prices that
progressively get lower as one moves towards the middle of the market. The lowest price is o¤ered
to the customer at  = 0:5:
Given the above utility function, the net surplus of each consumer following a standard transfor-
mation from the non-linear pricing literature (Armstrong 1996) is given by s()  u(q () ; ) p ().
Following the approach in the nonlinear pricing literature (Mussa and Rosen 1978, Maskin and Ri-
ley 1984, Sundararajan 2004), we substitute the pricing schedule, pR(); by the consumer surplus
function, sR() given that pR() = uR(qR(); )  sR(). Thus, we consider qR() and sR() as the
decision variables. Recall that each rm o¤ers a continuous menu of prices and qualities. Since con-
sumers choose any contract (p () ; q ()) from the menu, the incentive compatibility (IC) condition
for consumers is given by
sR() = max
t
  qR(t)  pR(t): (2)
From the rst order condition of (2) and using the envelope theorem, we have the following Lemma.
consumer, and in which it is rational and optimal for the consumer to choose the price and quality pair that was
designed for him or her. This type of transformation is standard in models of price screening (see, for instance,
Armstrong 1996).
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Lemma 1 ds
R()
d = q
R () and ds
L()
d =  qL () :
The proof of this Lemma and all other results is relegated to the Appendix. This Lemma implies
that
sR() = sR(B) +
Z 
B
qR(t)dt; (3)
sL() = sL(B) +
Z B

qL(t)dt: (4)
It follows that due to the presence of the incentive compatibility constraint, the slope of the surplus
function o¤ered by rm R, sR() is determined by its quality schedule, qR(): In this model, note
that competition between these two rms only a¤ects the surplus o¤ered to the consumer at the
boundary given by sR(B): Basically, this implies that these two rms compete by lowering the
pricing schedule by a constant, sR(B): Given the continuous product lines (where there is quality
level available for every possible consumer type ), there is a fear of cannibalization because some
high valuation consumers might end up buying the lower quality product. Consequently, rms need
to leave some information rents for the high valuation consumers (consumers located closer to 0
or 1) in order to prevent them from buying lower quality products. Basically without PPQ, rms
have to "reward" their loyal customers to prevent them from buying lower quality products. As a
result, the rms decision variables can be further simplied into q() and s(B); where s(B) is the
surplus of the marginal consumer who is indi¤erent between buying from either of the two rms.
Based on equation (1), the simplied objective function for rm R can be rewritten as
max
qR(); sR()
RN ; where 
R
N =
Z 1
B

qR()  sR()  (q
R) ()


d; (5)
Similarly, the optimization problem for rm L can be derived as follows:
max
qL(); sL()
LN ; where 
L
N =
Z B
0

(1  )qL()  sL()  (q
L) ()


d: (6)
Both (5) and (6) are subject to the same constraints as before. The detailed derivations are
provided in the Appendix. This leads to our rst result.
Proposition 1 The optimal prices, quality schedules and surplus functions of the No-PPQ case
10
are as follows:
qL() = (1  2)1=( 1);  2 [0; 1=2];
qR() = (2   1)1=( 1);  2 [1=2; 1];
sL() =
  1
2
(1  2)=( 1);  2 [0; 1=2];
sR() =
  1
2
(2   1)=( 1);  2 [1=2; 1];
pL() = (1  2)1=( 1)
 2 + + 1
2

;  2 [0; 1=2];
pR() = (2   1)1=( 1)

2 +   1
2

;  2 [1=2; 1]:
Since each rm covers half the market, the indi¤erent customer is located at  = 0:5: Note that
the total surplus generated by rm R is qR()   (qR)() : This implies that the socially optimal
quality level (rst-best solution) is given by qR () = 1=( 1): By comparing this quality level with
the optimal quality schedule actually o¤ered by the rm, we nd that the quality received by each
consumer is lower than the socially optimal level (except for the highest type whose  = 1). This
degradation of quality happens because of the potential for cannibalization. Basically, due to the
nature of the self-selection problem, higher the o¤ered quality by the rm to a consumer, more is
the information rent needed to be given to higher valuation consumers in order to prevent them
from deviating to buy its lower quality products. This causes the rm to distort the quality of the
product o¤ered to each consumer.
3.2 Only One Firm Has PPQ
Next, we analyze a situation in which only one rm has access to technologies which facilitate
PPQ. Without loss of generality, we assume that among these two rms, only rm R has PPQ. In
keeping with prior research (Thisse and Vives 1988, Choudhary et al. 2005, Liu and Zhang 2006),
we analyze the setting in which the PPQ rm makes its pricing decision after the No-PPQ rm.10
At stage 1, rm L (the rm without PPQ) announces its menu and allows consumers to self-select
a particular quality and price from its product line. At stage 2, rm R (the rm with PPQ) targets
every consumer with a specic quality and price in accordance with their type. In the nal stage,
10This setting has been widely adopted in the literature due to two reasons. First, a simultaneous choice of pricing
in this asymmetric game does not lead to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Similar to prior work, this is true in our
model as well. Further, the mixed strategy equilibrium is also analytically intractable. Second, in general personalized
pricing is executed for each consumer at the point of sale. Hence, a rm which engages in PPQ is likely to choose
its price after a rival that has a uniform pricing policy (which must be posted and committed to before sales occur).
In other words, the exibility implied by personalized pricing incorporates an implicit assumption on exibility in
timing as well.
11
consumers choose which rm to buy from and demand is realized. The solution concept of this
section is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Given any strategy of rm L, in equilibrium, rm R will o¤er the socially optimal level of
quality to maximize its prot because it can perfectly target consumers to avoid cannibalization.
Generally, whenever one rm acquires PPQ, it does not need to consider the cannibalization problem
since consumers can now be allocated the price and quality pair exactly in accordance with their
valuation. Let LR and 
R
R denote the prot of rm L and rm R, respectively in the this case.
Formally, the maximization problem of rm R can be written as
max
qR(); sR()
RR(); where 
R
R() = q
R()  sR()  (q
R) ()

;8 2 [0; 1]: (7)
Firm R sets the price, or equivalently, sets the surplus function sR(), such that each consumers
surplus exactly matches his/her surplus from the outside opportunity, which is either equal to zero or
equal to the surplus from buying from rm L. Given Rs strategy described above, Ls optimization
problem is the same as that in the No-PPQ case given by equation (6) except that (IR2), is replaced
by the socially optimal surplus curve of rm R given as follows:
sL(B) = max
qR()

qR()  (q
R) ()


j=B: (8)
If rm L were to o¤er less than the socially optimal surplus of rm R, then rm R could potentially
poach Ls consumers by o¤ering lower prices and by adjusting quality. The potential for poaching
exists since rm R can perfectly identify each consumer, and in particular, it can lower its price to
marginal cost for the consumer at the boundary. Thus, rm L can retain the marginal consumer at
B (that is, maintain its market share) only if its surplus sL(B) equals the socially optimal surplus
o¤ered by rm R. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the case when only one rm has PPQ, the optimal prices, quality schedules and
surplus functions are as follows:
qL() = (1  2)1=( 1);  2 [0; B];
qR() = 1=( 1);  2 [B; 1];
sL(B) = (1  1

)(1  2B)=( 1)  B=( 1);
sL() = sL(B)    1
2
(1  2B)=( 1) +   1
2
(1  2)=( 1);  2 [0; B];
sR() = max [0; (1  )qL(B)  pL(B)];  2 [B; 1]
pL() = (1  )(1  2)1=( 1)   sL();  2 [0; B];
pR() = =( 1)   sR();  2 [B; 1]:
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The marginal consumers type is given by B =
h
(2 1 1 )
 1
 + 2
i 1
: For the quadratic cost
function case this turns out to be B = 0:27: Although a general expression of s(B) and prices are
analytically tractable, the math is not easily parsable and so we do not present it in the main body
of the paper. However, we do derive several interesting results in the latter sections.
3.3 Both Firms Have PPQ
In this case, both rms have complete knowledge of each consumers type and are able to implement
PPQ. We term this the Both-PPQ case and derive the Nash equilibrium of this game. Since both
rms have full information about consumer preferences for price and quality, they engage in a
Bertrand-type price competition. Consequently, in equilibrium both rms o¤er a socially optimal
level of quality. A rm located closer to a given consumer will set a price schedule such that it can
exactly match the consumer surplus o¤ered by its rival. The rmsprot functions are given by
max
qL(); sL()
LBoth(); where 
L
Both() = (1  )qL()  sL() 
(qL) ()

; (9)
max
qR(); sR()
RBoth(); where 
R
Both() = q
R()  sR()  (q
R) ()

: (10)
where sL() and sR() are equal to the socially optimal surplus o¤ered by the rival rm. Formally,
sR() = max
qL()
"
(1  )qL() 
 
qL

()

#
= (1  1

)(1  )=( 1);  2 [1=2; 1]; (11)
sL() = max
qR()
"
qR() 
 
qR

()

#
= (1  1

)=( 1);  2 [0; 1=2]: (12)
Note that rm R o¤ers a surplus which is equal to the socially optimal surplus of rm L. If Rs
surplus is less than the socially optimal surplus o¤ered by L, L would be able to poach on Rs
consumers by increasing quality or decreasing price. If Rs surplus is more than that of L, it is not
maximizing its prot. Hence, it is optimal for rm R to increase its price to the prot maximizing
level.
Given the kind of price competition that will ensue between the two rms, we can determine
the surplus functions sL(); sR(); and hence point out the optimal price schedules. All consumers
whose  2 [1=2; 1]; buy from rm R in equilibrium. Similarly, all consumers whose  2 [0; 1=2];
buy from rm L in equilibrium: Basically, the equilibrium price from rm R (or from rm L) is set
so that consumers feel indi¤erent between buying from rm R and from rm L. The equilibrium
price o¤ered by each rm to its rivals consumers is set to marginal cost due to Bertrand price
competition. This leads to the following result.
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Proposition 3 The optimal prices, quality schedules and surplus functions when both rms have
PPQ are as follows:
qL() = (1  )1=( 1);  2 [0; 1=2];
qR() = 1=( 1);  2 [1=2; 1];
sL() = (1  1

)=( 1);  2 [0; 1=2];
sR() = (1  1

)(1  )=( 1);  2 [1=2; 1];
pL() = (1  )=( 1)   (1  1

)=( 1);  2 [0; 1=2];
pR() = =( 1)   (1  1

)(1  )=( 1);  2 [1=2; 1]:
Note again that since both rms are symmetrically equipped with PPQ, they share one-half
of the whole market, similar to the NoPPQ case. In equilibrium, both rms o¤er a socially
optimal level of quality. Further, note that compared to the No-PPQ case the adoption of PPQ
actually decreases the quality di¤erence between the products of a rm. However, since qualities
and prices are now targeted (with PPQ), rms do not need to degrade qualities. Intuitively this
occurs because from a rms perspective, there is no fear of cannibalization in this case. Recall that
since rms can allocate qualities by targeting consumers directly with PPQ, there are no consumer
self-selection problems. Consequently, rms do not have any incentive to degrade qualities o¤ered
to their customers. Thus, they provide their loyal customers products with better quality which
results in higher prices as well. This leads to higher prots than the No-PPQ case. On the other
hand, despite o¤ering their competitors loyal customers with lower qualities and lower prices (both
rmsprices fall to marginal cost in their respective rivals turfs) they are unable to poach on their
competitors territory.11 A comparison of quality schedules o¤ered reveals that when a rm adopts
PPQ, it increases the quality o¤ered to each consumer. However, the rm without PPQ keeps its
quality schedule unchanged. When both rms adopt PPQ, their qualities are always higher than
the NoPPQ qualities. This enables them to o¤er a higher quality than in the No-PPQ case and
charge higher prices. We discuss these results in detail in the following sections.
11The implicit notion here is that consumers buy from the rm o¤ering a higher quality product even if the surplus
o¤ered by both rms is exactly the same.
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4 Analysis
4.1 Prices
We plot the price curves for quadratic and cubic cost functions in Figures 1 and 2 for each of the
three cases: (i) neither rm has PPQ, (ii) one rm (rm R, without loss of generality) has PPQ and
(iii) both rms have PPQ. Interestingly, note that when  = 2; the price functions are convex, while
when  = 3; the price functions are concave.12 The thick continuous U-shaped curves indicate the
price function when both rms have PPQ or when neither rm has PPQ. It is immediate to see that
rm prices are always higher in the BothPPQ case. The dotted discontinuous curve represents
the price function for the case when only one rm (rm R) has PPQ. Note that when only rm R
has PPQ, rm L o¤ers a higher price compared to the No-PPQ case but lower than the Both-PPQ
case. On the other hand, rm Rs price is higher than its price in the No-PPQ and the Both-PPQ
cases. This leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose the cost function is quadratic ( = 2). (i) Then, the adoption of PPQ by
both rms leads to higher prices for all consumers compared to the No-PPQ case. (ii) When only
one rm adopts PPQ, the rm without PPQ increases its price to all its consumers, compared to
the No-PPQ case. However, some potential consumers of the rm without PPQ, buy from the PPQ
rm at lower prices than in the No-PPQ case.
Figure 1: Price with or without PPQ
(=2)
Figure 2: Price with or without PPQ
(=3)
12The intuition behind this comes from the fact that a price charged to a consumer is determined by two e¤ects:
(i) that of the o¤ered quality (quality e¤ect) and, (ii) that of the information rent left for the consumers. These two
forces have countervailing e¤ects and thus the net shape of the pricing function depends on which of the two forces
dominate. Moreover, as  increases it becomes relatively more costly to o¤er higher quality products. Hence, quality
schedules become more concave, and the pricing function also becomes more concave.
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Consider the case when  = 2: When R is the only rm that o¤ers PPQ, its market coverage
extends across the region where  2 [0:27; 1] while rm L covers the market where  2 [0; 0:27].
Notice that when rm R has PPQ, rm Ls price is always higher than its No-PPQ price. However,
rm Rs price is lower than rm Ls No-PPQ price in the region of  2 [0:27; 0:38]: Thus, consumers
in this region get a lower price. Essentially the intuition is as follows: Since rm R (the rm with
PPQ) knows the preferences of each consumer, it has the exibility to target some of its rivals
consumers. Firm L (the rm without PPQ) knows that rm R can o¤er a lower quality and lower
price at the margin, and thus lure away some of its own consumers, especially those with relatively
weaker preferences for its products (customers whose type  2 [0:27; 0:5]; given by the triangular
shaded regions in each gure). Although rm L can respond strategically by lowering its price to
prevent this poaching, it is less protable for rm L to do so, and hence it does not nd it optimal
to sell to all of its own potential consumers by lowering its price. On the contrary, by increasing its
price it is able to extract a higher surplus from its loyal customers (customers whose type  2 [0;
0:27] ) who have a stronger preference for its products. This results in higher overall prots than
those accruing from undercutting rm R and engaging in a head-head competition for some less
protable customers. Consequently, rm L o¤ers a higher price compared to the No-PPQ case.
Thus, the adoption of PPQ by one rm alleviates the price competition between rms and raises
the average prices. Indeed as we see from the gure above, when one rm (rm R) has PPQ, for
a wide space in the parameter region of  its price is higher than the price it o¤ers in the No-PPQ
and the Both-PPQ cases.
4.2 Consumer Surplus
Figure 3: Consumer surplus for di¤erent . Figure 4: Social welfare for di¤erent .
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Proposition 4 (i) When both rms have PPQ, consumer surplus is non-monotonic in valuations
in that low valuation consumers get higher surplus compared to high valuation consumers. Speci-
cally, for all  2 [0; b]; and for all  2 [1  b; 1]; consumers get lower surplus when both rms have
PPQ in contrast to the No-PPQ scenario. Thus, when both rms have PPQ consumers located in
the middle of the market have the highest surplus in contrast to the No-PPQ scenario wherein these
consumers (in the middle) have the lowest surplus. (ii) Further, when one rm has PPQ, some of
its consumers are left with positive surplus.
In the No-PPQ scenario, the fact that consumers in the middle (or the ones which have the
lowest inclination to buy from either rm) have the lowest surplus comes from Lemma 1 based on
the incentive compatible constraints: This is similar to the non-linear pricing literature (Mussa &
Rosen 1978) where the lowest consumer type gets a zero surplus since each rm acts as a local
monopolist. Here as well, the local monopolist captures the entire surplus of the consumer at
the boundary ( = 0:5) as seen from gure 3. On the other hand, in the Both-PPQ scenario,
consumer surplus provided by one rm is determined by its rivals socially optimal welfare curve.
We can indeed verify that the surplus provided by each rm to a given consumer increases as the
consumers location gets closer to the rival rm as stated in the beginning of this section. As a
result, consumers located in the middle receive a higher consumer surplus, with the highest surplus
accruing to the consumer located at  = 0:5.
Interestingly, this result suggests that consumers who are the least loyal to either rm, are
the ones who are the most well-o¤ when both rms adopt PPQ. Thus, we show in gure 3 that
consumer surplus is monotonic (non-monotonic) in valuations depending on whether rms dont
have (have) access to such PPQ technologies.13 Moreover, we note that as the cost of quality
decreases ( increases), the optimal quality o¤ered to any consumer also increases. Hence, the
surplus accruing to any consumer also increases with : This is true when both rms have PPQ as
well as when neither rm has PPQ (except for the consumer located at  = 0:5).We nd that the
total consumer surplus is highest when neither rm has access to PPQ. Thus, the adoption of PPQ
enables the rms to extract the maximum rent from consumers. Once again, the additional rents
from quality enhancement outweigh the price competition e¤ect from personalized pricing leading
to a lower consumer surplus.14
13Prior literature in Hotelling models (for example, Ulph and Vulkan 2000) have shown that if transportation
costs do not increase fast with distance then all consumers get lower prices (and higher surplus) when rms practice
personalized pricing. This is in contrast to our results where we show that the most loyal consumers get zero surplus
while the least loyal consumers get positive surplus, and that the size of these loyal segments is driven by the
convexity of the cost function () parameter.
14Note that this is in contrast to prior work in personalized pricing (for example, Choudhary et al. 2005) who
show that total consumer surplus is highest when both rms engage in personalized pricing. In their model this
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We nd that when one rm adopts PPQ, the consumer surplus from its rival is higher than
that in the Both-PPQ case, but lower than in the No-PPQ case. The intuition is driven by the
increase in average prices when one rm adopts PPQ. Further, note that when one rm (rm R, for
example) has PPQ, not all of its consumers are left with zero surplus. Of course, its own immediate
consumers (those whose type  2 [0:5; 1]) do not get any surplus at all. However, there are some
consumers in rm Ls territory, that R is able to capture by o¤ering them lower qualities at lower
prices. These consumers in the region whose type  2 (0:27; 0:5); are served by the PPQ rm, and
consequently a small proportion of them get a positive surplus. Specically, when  = 2 consumers
in the region where  2 (0:27; 0:35) get positive surplus whereas the remaining consumers are left
with no surplus.
4.3 Welfare
We plot the welfare curves in Figure 4 for each of the two cases as before: neither rm has PPQ,
and both rms have PPQ. We dene welfare of a consumer as the sum of the rms prot from
that consumer and the surplus accruing to that consumer. Note from gure 4 that the total welfare
is highest when both rms adopt PPQ. Next, we show that the adoption of PPQ by one rm (for
example, rm R) has interesting welfare implications.
Corollary 2 Suppose the cost function is quadratic ( = 2). (i) When only one rm adopts PPQ,
social welfare is lower than the NoPPQ and the Both-PPQ cases because of the misallocation
e¤ect. (ii) When both rms adopt PPQ, social welfare is highest.
The intuition for this result is similar to that for Corollary 1. The misallocation e¤ect arises
because in a socially optimal situation consumers whose  2 [0:27; 0:5] should have ideally bought
from rm L while those customers whose  2 [0:5; 1] should have bought from rm R. However,
when rm R has PPQ, it induces some of Ls consumers (those with  2 [0:27; 0:5]) to buy from it
by o¤ering them lowering qualities at lower prices. This lowering of o¤ered quality to each consumer
(from the rst-best solution wherein q () = ) results in a welfare loss compared to the socially
optimal scenario.
In general, in the No-PPQ scenario only the highest consumer type (that located at  = 1
or  = 0) gets the socially optimal quality. In the Both-PPQ case all consumers get the socially
optimal quality. Since both rms can identify each consumer, they do not need to degrade the
result occurs since rms could only personalize pricesthe products o¤ered to all consumers were the same. Hence,
the competitive e¤ect of aggravated price competition led to lower prices than in the scenario when rms did not
practice personalized pricing.
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o¤ered qualities in order to prevent possible cannibalization, wherein the higher consumer types
choose lower qualities. That is, rms can maintain the incentive compatibility constraints without
having to lower the quality o¤ered to a given consumer.
When one rm has PPQ (say rm R for example), while all the immediate consumers of the PPQ
rm (those located between 0:5 and 1) get a socially optimal quality, only the highest type of the
rm without PPQ (rm L in this case) gets the socially optimal quality. The remaining consumers
of rm L (located between 0 and 0:27) as well those consumers of rm L (located between 0:27 and
0:5) who have been poached by rm R get less than socially optimal quality. In sum, although the
quality qR() increases up to the socially optimal level, not all consumers served by rm R receive
a higher quality product. Consequently, social welfare will be lower from transacting with some
consumer types within the region where  2 [0:27; 0:5]:
4.4 Firm Prots
Proposition 5 The adoption of PPQ does not lead to a Prisoners Dilemma. Both rms are
always better o¤ adopting PPQ compared to the No-PPQ case.
Figure 5: Prots with or without PPQ for di¤erent 
From gure 5, we can observe that the prots in the Both-PPQ case are always higher than
that in the No-PPQ case for any value of . This result arises because of the quality enhancement
e¤ect. Each rm o¤ers a continuum of qualities, and then allocates a personalized quality at a
personalized price for each consumer.15 This leads to a higher rent extraction ability from the
loyal consumers of each rm since it acts as a local monopolist. Even though the rm leaves some
surplus to consumers in the middle, the positive quality enhancement e¤ect o¤sets the negative
price competition e¤ect, and thereby makes it possible for symmetric rms to increase prots after
15Recall that each rm o¤ers a continuous menu of price and quality pairs. We use the phrase "continuum of
qualities" to refer to the same phenomenon.
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adopting PPQ. Basically when both rms have PPQ, they do not have any incentive to leave any
surplus for their loyal consumers that is higher than the surplus from the outside opportunity(in
the Both-PPQ case the outside opportunity is the surplus o¤ered by the rival rm). Since these
loyal consumers have minimal valuation for the rival rms products, neither rm has an incentive
to o¤er them any positive surplus. Therefore, they end up charging higher prices and reaping
greater prots.
5 Extensions
5.1 Asymmetric rms (Market size)
In this section we consider the case in which rms are asymmetric in size such that one rm has
a larger loyal customer base than the other rm. We model this in the following way. Firms
are still located at 0 and 1 as before. However, in contrast with the prior section, customers are
uniformly distributed from 0 to r, 0:5  r  1:16 We are interested in analyzing the impact of a
loyal customer segment, which is determined by the value of r. As before, we have three cases: (i)
Neither rm has PPQ, (ii) Only one rm has PPQ, and (iii) Both rms have PPQ. The solution
concept is exactly the same as that in the benchmark case and is omitted here for brevity. We list
the optimal quality schedules as follows:
Lemma 2 The optimal quality schedules are given as follows:
Neither rm has PPQ Both rms have PPQ
qL() = (1  2)1=( 1);  2 [0; B1];
qR() = (2   r)1=( 1);  2 [B1; r]:
qL() = (1  )1=( 1);  2 [0; B4];
qR() = 1=( 1);  2 [B4; r]:
Only L has PPQ Only R has PPQ
qL() = (1  )1=( 1);  2 [0; B2];
qR() = (2   r)1=( 1);  2 [B2; r]:
qL() = (1  2)1=( 1);  2 [0; B3];
qR() = 1=( 1);  2 [B3; r]:
This leads to the following result about how rms change their quality schedules with the
adoption of PPQ by either one or both rms. The values of the marginal customer (Bi) are derived
in the Appendix.
Proposition 6 (a) Compared to the No-PPQ case, (i) when the larger rm gets PPQ, it always
increases its quality level while the smaller rm keeps its quality schedule unchanged. (ii) when the
smaller rm gets PPQ, it always increases its quality while the larger rm keeps its quality schedule
16Note that when r <0.5, only rm L can exist in the market when both rms have PPQ, and thus a comparison
becomes moot.
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unchanged. (b) Conversely, compared to the Both-PPQ case, (i) when the smaller rm gets PPQ,
the larger rm decreases its quality while the smaller rm keeps its quality schedule unchanged. (ii)
when the larger rm gets PPQ, the smaller rm decreases its quality while the larger rm keeps its
quality schedule unchanged.
The intuition for this result is similar to that in Corollary 2. Basically, any rm which gets PPQ
will not have an incentive to degrade qualities because it no longer has to worry about consumer
self-selection and product cannibalization. Hence, it increases its quality schedule. An interesting
observation is that when one rm acquires PPQ, it changes its quality compared to the No-PPQ case
but keeps it unchanged compared to the Both-PPQ case. Intuitively this occurs because competition
between rms only determines the surplus function, and consequently the optimal price functions.
Notice that when both rms have PPQ, we nd that optimal prices, quality schedules and surplus
functions are independent of the range of  between which consumers are distributed (i.e. the
quality and price schedules are independent of r). This is because rms know the preferences of
each consumer and are able to o¤er them the corresponding (price, quality) schedule in accordance
with their type. When one rm acquires PPQ, it increases its quality schedule to all types in
comparison to what it was o¤ering in the absence of PPQ. As a consequence, the total welfare will
be higher for customers buying from the rm with PPQ.
5.2 PPQ Technology Adoption Decision
Next, we investigate when and which rm will adopt PPQ, when adopting PPQ entails a cost.
Suppose in the very rst stage, each rm decides whether or not to adopt the PPQ technology at
a xed cost of F . In the second stage, similar to the previous analysis, rms play a simultaneous
pricing game when both rms have PPQ (or when both rms do not have PPQ). They play a
sequential pricing game when only one rm has PPQ. We are interested in determining the range
of xed costs over which the adoption of PPQ leads to a positive outcome for both rms or a
negative outcome such as a Prisoners Dilemma where both rms are worse-o¤ in comparison to
the scenario when neither of them have PPQ. In order to determine the impact of market size and
customer loyalty on each rms optimal strategies, we generalize the range over which customers
are uniformly distributed. In particular, we consider two stylized examples; one in which customer
type  is distributed between [1  r; r] (which we refer to as the symmetric case), and the other in
which customer type  is distributed from [0; r] (which we refer to as the asymmetric case). From
the symmetric case, we are able to analyze the situation when each rms loyal segment changes
equally. In the asymmetric case, the size of the loyal segment is di¤erent for each rm.
21
5.2.1 Symmetric Case
From the expressions stated in the supplementary technical Appendix C, we can solve the total
prot of each case. When the customer type is uniformly distributed from [1   r; r], we have the
following payo¤ matrix.
Pay-o¤s R, No-PPQ R, PPQ
L, No-PPQ (LN ; 
R
N ) (
L
R; 
R
R   F )
L, PPQ (LL   F; RL ) (LBoth   F; RBoth   F )
The rmspayo¤s with a change in the value of r are shown in gure 6a. A complete charac-
terization of all Nash Equilibria (NE) is depicted in gure 6b.
Figure 6a: Firm Payo¤s with PPQ Figure 6b: PPQ Adoption When Firms are Symmetric.
Given gures 6a and 6b, we rst have the following result.
Observation 1: Suppose  = 2: (i) When the customer types are uniformly distributed in [1 r; r]
and r > 0:775; the prot of each rm is higher after both rms adopt PPQ. When r  0:775;
the prot of each rm is smaller after both rms adopt PPQ. (ii) Moreover, it is not a dominant
strategy for a rm to adopt PPQ even if its competitor were to have PPQ.
We can observe that when r is larger than 0:775; it is possible to have situations in which both
rms are better o¤ after the adoption of PPQ. From this result, we conclude that when both rms
have a larger loyal segment, it is less likely that the adoption of PPQ will lead to a Prisoners
Dilemma. On the other hand, if both rms have few loyal customers, the adoption of PPQ will
lead to a Prisoners Dilemma. This result is in contrast with that of Sha¤er and Zhang (2002)
who show that the rm with a smaller market size is always worse-o¤ after the adoption of PPQ.
This happens because in their model the price competition e¤ect is stronger than the market share
e¤ect. In contrast, in our model the rent extraction e¤ect due to quality enhancement dominates
the adverse e¤ect of price competition and this result is stronger when rms have a larger proportion
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of loyal consumers (when r increases) because the marginal benet from the quality enhancement
e¤ect will be higher for such rms.
In gure 6b, the thick black line below the triangular region is the di¤erence between RR and
RN : When the xed cost of PPQ technology, F , is higher than this level neither rm will adopt
PPQ. The second line in the middle of this gure is the di¤erence in the prot of rm L when both
rms have PPQ and when only rm R has PPQ, i.e. the di¤erence between LBoth and 
L
R: When
F is higher than this level, if R adopts PPQ, L will not adopt it to facilitate a level-playing eld
and vice-versa. In other words, in that region even with symmetric rms we have two asymmetric
Nash equilibria in which only one rm adopts PPQ. Thus, we nd that depending on the costs of
adopting PPQ, it is not a dominant strategy for a rm to adopt PPQ even if its competitor adopts
PPQ. The lowest line at the bottom is the di¤erence of LBoth and 
L
N : When F is below it, both
rms are better o¤ after adopting PPQ.
5.2.2 Asymmetric Case
In general, when a rm has a larger loyal segment, its incremental benet from adopting PPQ
is higher compared to the rm with a smaller loyal segment. Formally, when r is close to 1, the
benet of simultaneous adoption of PPQ by both rms is higher for rm R (smaller rm).
Figure 7a: Prots of rm L (larger rm). Figure 7b: Prots of rm R (smaller rm).
Notice from gures 7a and 7b that with an increase in the size of the loyal segment (r), the
adoption of PPQ always leads to lower prots for the larger rm and higher prots for the smaller
rm. From gure 7b, note that when the larger rm has PPQ, the adoption of PPQ may in
some cases be detrimental for the smaller rm compared with the No-PPQ case, especially when
r  0:79. By comparing the Both-PPQ and Only L-PPQ curves, we can conclude that adopting
PPQ is not a dominant strategy for the smaller rm especially when the larger rm has PPQ and
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the number of loyal customers it has is less than a certain threshold. We analyze the impact of the
size of the loyal segment (r) on rmsPPQ adoption decisions, which leads to Observation 2.
Observation 2: As the extent of asymmetry in market size increases (as r decreases), the
range of values over which both rms are better o¤ by adopting PPQ decreases.
6 Managerial Implications and Conclusion
Firmsare increasingly realizing that the ability to establish attractive value propositions and turn
them into personalized and compelling o¤ers across the right channel for the right customer at the
most opportune moment - drives customer relationships, and prots. This has led to a widespread
adoption of CRM and personalization technologies by rms in di¤erent industries such as long
distance telecommunications, industrial products, mobile telephone service, hotels, IT hardware,
nancial services, online retailing, credit cards, etc., in order to inuence their customer acquisition
and retention strategies. Moreover increasing availability of exible manufacturing technologies is
facilitating quality enhancement through customization.
Our novelty consists in combining both personalized pricing and targeted quality allocation in
the same theoretical framework. Our model highlights how rms should allocate product or service
qualities, and prices, and how in turn, such targeting decisions impact the surplus of consumers,
and overall social welfare. In contrast to prior work, we show that quality enhancement through
targeted quality allocation leads to less aggravated price competition by strengthening the oppor-
tunities for rent extraction for rms, when rms are able to personalize prices as well. Thus, the
adoption of PPQ technologies such as customer relationship management systems (CRM) and ex-
ible manufacturing systems (FMS) by competing rms can make even symmetric rms better-o¤.
That is, when rms can better target the allocation of qualities and prices, and o¤er a broader prod-
uct line, competition becomes less intense because a greater proportion of the potential consumers
now has a higher willingness to pay for the rmsproducts. Prior work (Sha¤er and Zhang 2002)
has identied situations where asymmetric rms can avoid the Prisoners Dilemma through the
market share e¤ect. We show that even symmetric rms can avoid a Prisoners Dilemma because
of the quality enhancement e¤ect.
We account for the cost of PPQ technologies which can include, for instance, the cost of FMS
in the case that the product quality is enhanced, or the cost incurred in providing personalized
services for each consumer. Even after explicitly accounting for such costs, we nd regions where
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symmetric rms are better-o¤ after engaging in PPQ.
Another implication of our analysis is that the adoption of CRM technologies leads to an increase
in the quality level of the entire product line of a rm. This is relevant for a rms pricing and
product line decision since the adoption of PPQ negates the threat from intra-rm competition
that was prevalent in the absence of PPQ. Basically, rms which adopt PPQ only need to consider
inter-rm competition, and hence it is optimal for them to o¤er a signicant product quality/service
improvement.
Our paper also o¤ers insights on the di¤erent product quality schedules o¤ered by rms, given
that one or both rms can implement PPQ. Compared to the No-PPQ scenario, when one rm
adopts PPQ, it always increases its quality level while the other rm keeps its quality schedule
unchanged. Conversely, compared to the Both-PPQ scenario, when a rm drops PPQ, it always
decreases its quality schedule while the other rm keeps its quality schedule unchanged. Such
changes in o¤ered qualities are often seen in practice. In industrial product markets, these kinds
of changes in quality schedules are often done through stripping o¤ some value-added customer
service, such as next-day on-site repair versus same-day 8-hour repair, a 99% uptime guarantee
versus a 99.99%, or simply by o¤ering additional services as educational programs, 24-hour repair,
consulting services, quality control assurance and testing, just-in-time (JIT) delivery, and so on.
Another example is that of hardware vendors like HP and IBM who di¤erentiate themselves by
providing superior warrantees, new generation web-based applications, as well as clustering and
security management software embedded in the same hardware box.
The adoption of PPQ by both rms has a di¤erential impact on average consumer surplus as
well as on the surplus accruing to any one consumer beyond a certain location. While PPQ adoption
leads to lower average consumer surplus, interestingly, we nd that some consumers are actually
better o¤ when both rms adopt PPQ. That is, there is a transfer of surplus among consumers. In
particular, consumers located closer to the middle of the marketwho are the least loyal to either
rm or have the lowest willingness to pay for either rms products, are the ones who are the most
better-o¤ when both rms adopt PPQ technologies. This is in contrast to a scenario when neither
rm has a PPQ technology, when the very same consumers who are least likely to buy either rms
products, are the most worse-o¤. From a public policy perspective, our analysis of social welfare
highlights that social welfare is highest when both rms adopt PPQ. Indeed even if one rm adopts
PPQ, social welfare is higher than the situation where neither rm has PPQ. However in such a
case, the total welfare for some consumers can be lower because of the misallocation of products.
In particular, because some customers of the rm without PPQ end up buying from the rm with
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PPQ at lower prices and lower qualities, we see a decrease in social welfare for those regions.
An interesting result is the emergence of asymmetric equilibria: situations where one rm
adopts PPQ and its rival does not, despite both rms being ex-ante symmetric. This is driven
by the presence of xed costs of PPQ adoption. This has important implications since in many
industries we do see such disparities in technology investments by rms of similar size and market
share. Our analysis also suggests that starting from asymmetric rms (in the size of their loyal
segments) when rms become progressively symmetric, then the adoption of PPQ technologies
is increasingly benecial to both rms. This suggests that industries with a higher level of rm
concentration will have greater incentives to adopt such technologies and invest in loyalty building
measures.
Our paper has several limitations, some of which can be fruitful areas of research. For example,
we have only considered symmetric cost functions for both rms. Some rms may have operational
e¢ ciencies which can give rise to less convex production costs when customizing quality. It would be
interesting to see how rmsstrategies change under such scenarios. Another interesting extension
would be to study competition in markets with discrete segments such as loyals and switchers,
when rms adopt non-linear pricing schedules. A third area of related research would be to allow
competing rms to invest in loyalty building measures, such as switching costs, before they invest
in PPQ. Finally, we do not consider consumers making strategic choices in revealing information
about their preferences. One could consider a scenario where higher valuation consumers might
want to mimic lower types and vice-versa, in anticipation that some consumers are left with positive
surplus while others are not when rms engage in PPQ. Incorporating such a situation is beyond
the scope of this paper but it might be an interesting extension to pursue in a related framework.
We hope our research paves the way for more future work in this domain.
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1 Appendix
1.1 Neither Firm has PPQ
Proof of Proposition 1
We proceed in a series of steps by rst stating and proving several lemmas.
Lemma 1 ds
R()
d = q
R () and ds
L()
d =  qL () :
First, recall that each rm maintains a menu of prices and qualities. Since consumers choose any contract
from the menu, the incentive compatibility condition for consumers is given by
sR() = max
t
  qR(t)  pR(t): (1)
The rst order condition is
  @q
R(t)
@t
  @p
R(t)
@t
= 0: (2)
This equation holds at t =  because consumers self-select the price and quality pair designed for them. By
di¤erentiating equation (1), we have
dsR()
d
= qR() +   @q
R()
@
  @p
R()
@
;
) ds
R()
d
= qR(): (3)
In the second equation, the last two terms are zero because of the rst-order condition as shown above in
equation (2). Using the same procedure, it can be shown that
dsL()
d
=  qL():
This Lemma implies that
sR() = sR(B) +
Z 
B
qR(t)dt
sL() = sL(B) +
Z B

qL(t)dt:
Note that the IC constraint ensures that a consumer prefers the contract that was designed for him, and the
IR constraint guarantee that each consumer type accepts his designated contract. Hence, in this case (IC)
implies that the slope of sR() is equal to qR() as shown in Lemma 1: In this model, competition between
two rms a¤ects only the surplus to the consumer at the boundary (which for example is equal to sR(B)
for rm R), which is a constant. This implies that two rms compete by lowering the pricing schedule by
a constant, sR(B): Higher consumer types will receive higher surplus; this is termed as information rent in
the non-linear pricing literature: This implies that whenever the rm increases the quality o¤ered to any
consumer, it has to leave higher information rents to higher consumer types in order to avoid cannibalization
during self-selection.
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As a result, our decision variables can be further simplied as q() and s(B), where s(B) is the surplus
of the marginal consumer who is indi¤erent between buying from two rms. Substituting for sR(); the
simplied objective function for rm R can be rewritten as
max
qR(); sR()
RN ; where 
R
N =
Z 1
B

qR()  sR()  (q
R) ()


d;
s:t: sR ()  0; sL(B) = sR(B):
After substituting for the value of sR(); the optimization problem becomes equal to
max
qR(); sR(B)
RN ; where 
R
N =
Z 1
B
"
qR()  (q
R) ()

  sR(B) 
Z 
B
qR(t)dt
#
d: (4)
Changing the order of integration of the last term in the bracket1 , we can simplify the objective function
as
RN =
Z 1
B

qR()  (q
R) ()

  sR(B)  qR()(1  )

d; (5)
=
Z 1
B

(2   1)qR()  (q
R) ()

  sR(B)

d: (6)
Similarly, the optimization problem for rm L is given as follows:
max
qL();sL()
LN ; where 
L
N =
Z B
0

(1  )qL()  sL()  (q
L) ()


d; (7)
s:t: sL ()  0; sL(B) = sR(B):
After substituting for the value of sl(); the optimization problem becomes equal to
max
qL(); sL(B)
LN ; where 
L
N =
Z B
0

(1  2)qL()  (q
L) ()

  sL(B)

d: (8)
The optimal quality schedule can be determined by maximizing the integrand point-wise (the terms in
the bracket). This leads to the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium quality schedules are qR() = (2   1)1=( 1) and qL() = (1  2)1=( 1):
Di¤erentiating terms in the bracket of (5) with respect to qR(); we have
   (qR) 1 ()  (1  ) = 0: (9)
=) qR() = (2   1)1=( 1)
The solution of rm L can be derived in a similar manner. To nd the solution of sR(B); we di¤erentiate
the objective functions w.r.t. sR(B) and derive the following Lemma by Leibniz Theorem.
1
R 1
B
hR 
B q
R(t)dt
i
d =
R 1
B
hR 1
t q
R(t)d
i
dt =
R 1
B q
R(t)(1  t)dt = R 1B qR()(1  )d
2
Lemma A2 The equilibrium consumer surplus at the boundary is given by sR(B) = sL(B) = 0:
Dene the terms in the bracket of (6) as X. Using Leibniz Theorem, we have
dRN
dsR(B)
=
Z 1
B
@X
@sR(B)
d  Xj=B  dB
dsR(B)
:
As a result, by di¤erentiating (6) with respect to sR(B); we haveZ 1
B
 1  d| {z }
1s t term
 

(2B   1)qR(B)  (q
R) (B)

  sR(B)

| {z }
2n d term
dB
dsR(B)| {z }
3rd term
= 0: (10)
These terms represents the costs and benets that accrue to rm R if it changes its price by one unit.
Intuitively, when price is lowered by 1 unit, the rst term represents the aggregate loss in revenue from
all existing consumers of rm R. The second and third terms together represent the gain in revenue from
attracting some potential consumers in rm Ls territory. Specically, the second term represents the prot
from the marginal consumer and the third term represents the gain in market share from infra-marginal
consumers that occurs by lowering price by one unit. From Lemma 1, we know that
dB
dsR(B)
=
dB
dsL(B)
; (given that sR(B) = sL(B))
=
1
 qL (B)
Substituting this back to (10), we have
(B   1) 

(2B   1)qR(B)  (q
R) (B)

  sR(B)

1
 qL (B) = 0:
After rearranging terms the above equation can be written as
sR(B) = qL (B) (B   1) + (2B   1)qR(B)  (q
R) (B)

: (11)
In the symmetric equilibrium, B = 1=2. Moreover, from Lemma A2 we know that qL (B) = qR (B) = 0:
Substituting these in equation (11) we have
sR(B) = 0:
The complete solutions are summarized in the statement of the proposition. Quality schedules are derived
in Lemma 1. By denitions, sL() = 0+
R 1=2

qL(t)dt and sR() = 0+
R 
1=2
qR(t)dt: Hence, the optimal surplus
functions are given by
sL() =
  1
2
(1  2)=( 1):
sR() =
  1
2
(2   1)=( 1):
The optimal price schedules are derived by substituting pL() = (1  )qL()  sL() and pR() = qR() 
sR(): Hence, the optimal prices are given by
pL() = (1  )(1  2)1=( 1)     1
2
(1  2)=( 1); (12)
= (1  2)1=( 1)
 2 + + 1
2

:
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pR() = (2   1)1=( 1)     1
2
(2   1)=( 1); (13)
= (2   1)1=( 1)(2 +   1
2
):
1.1.1 Total Welfare, Surplus and Prots
Since rms are symmetric, it is su¢ cient to present the results for any one rm. Without loss of generality,
consider rm L. Then the total surplus is given by
sLN = s
R
N =
Z 1=2
0
  1
2
(1  2)=( 1)d = (  1)
2
4(2  1) :
The total welfare function is given by
wLN =
Z 1=2
0
[uL(q(); )  c(q())]d;
=
Z 1=2
0
[(1  )(1  2)1=( 1)   1

(1  2)=( 1)]d;
=
(2 1 1 + 3)
4( 1 1 + 1)(
1
 1 + 2)
    1
2(2  1) ;
=
3 (  1)2
4(2  1) :
Finally, prots are given by
LN = w
L
N   sLN =
(  1)2
2(2  1) :
1.2 Only One Firm has PPQ
Proof of Proposition 2
In this case, recall that we solve a sequential pricing game since the simultaneous pricing game does not
have a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. Without loss of generality, let R be the rm with PPQ. In stage 2,
given rm Ls quality and pricing schedules, rm R will set its quality schedule equal to the socially optimal
quality schedule. Basically, rm R will set the price so that the consumers feel indi¤erent between buying
from L or R.2 Formally, the problem of rm R in this case is
max
qR();sR()
RR(); where 
R
R() = q
R()  sR()  (q
R) ()

;8 2 [0; 1]: (14)
The equilibrium quality schedule, qR(); can be determined by the rst order condition given by
@RR()
@qR()
=    (qR) 1 () = 0:
=) qR() = 1=( 1)
2 Here, we assume that L does not o¤er any additional contracts (price-quality pairs) to Rs consumers. In other words,
the outside opportunity of Rs customers is equal to (1  )qL(B)  pL(B):
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Ls optimization problem is the same as that in the No-PPQ case except that the individual rationality
constraint (IR2) is now di¤erent (please see below). Since this does not a¤ect the optimal quality schedule
for rm L, it is the same as that in the No-PPQ case and is equal to the following:
qL() = (1  2)1=( 1):
Next we determine the surplus function of rm L. Note that the surplus o¤ered by rm L will depend on rm
Rs socially optimal surplus curve. If rm L were to o¤er less than the socially optimal surplus of rm R,
then rm R could potentially poach Ls consumers by o¤ering lower prices. The potential for poaching exists
since R can perfectly identify each consumer. Ls optimization problem is the same as that in the No-PPQ
case except that the individual rationality constraint (IR2), instead of being given by sL(B) = sR(B), is
replaced by the socially optimal surplus curve of rm R. Specically, it is given by
sL(B) = max
qR()

qR()  (q
R) ()


j=B :
Similar to the Proof of Lemma 1.1, di¤erentiating (8) with respect to sL(B); we have
@LR()
@sL(B)
=  B +

(1  2B)qL(B)  sL(B)  (q
L) (B)


dB
dsL(B)
= 0: (15)
Given that
sL(B) = max
qR(B)
BqR(B)  (q
R) (B)

= (1  1

)B
=( 1)
;
we have
dB
dsL(B)
= B 1=( 1): (16)
Substituting this back in (15), it follows that
sL(B) =  B B1=( 1) +

(1  2B)qL(B)  (q
L) (B)


;
= (1  1

)(1  2B)=( 1)  B=( 1):
Given that the marginal consumer feels indi¤erent between buying from rm L and rm R, we have
sL(B) = wR(B)
, (1  1

)(1  2B)=( 1)  B=( 1) = (1  1

)B=( 1);
, B =

(
2  1
  1 )
( 1)= + 2
 1
:
As a consequence, the consumer surplus function of rm L is given by
sL() = sL(B) +
Z B

(1  2t)1=( 1)dt;
= sL(B)  (  1
2
)(1  2B)=( 1) + (  1
2
)(1  2)=( 1):
Next we derive the consumer surplus function for rm R. Firm R sets the price, equivalently sR(), such
that each consumers surplus exactly matches his/her surplus from the outside opportunity. Recall that the
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outside opportunity of Rs consumers is either 0 or equal to the surplus o¤ered by rm L which is determined
by the contract o¤ered to the marginal consumer (qL(B); sL(B)). As a result, the consumer surplus function
of rm R is given by
sR() = max (0; (1  )qL(B)  pL(B)):
Note that we already have derived the expressions for (qL(); sL()) and (qR(); sR()). Hence, by substi-
tuting the relevant expressions in p() = u(q(); )  s();we have
pL() = (1  )(1  2)1=( 1)   sL();  2 [0; B];
pR() = =( 1)   sR();  2 [B; 1]:
1.2.1 Total Welfare, Surplus and Prots
Due to the fact that B, sL(B); and sL() dont have simple closed form solutions, we cannot present the
prices and prots in closed-form solutions. However, we can derive the relevant expressions for a given value
of : For example, when  = 2; we nd that
B = 2 
p
3 = 0:27
Since rm L moves rst, we derive the relevant expressions for surplus, price, and welfare functions respec-
tively as follows:
sL(B) =
7
2
  2
p
3:
sL() =
1
2

 2 + 22 + 2
p
3  3

:
pL() =  2 + 2  
p
3 +
5
2
:
The total surplus, welfare and prot functions for rm L are given as follows:
sLR =
Z B
0
sL()d =
1
2
p
3  5
6
:
wLR =
Z B
0
wL()d =
3
2
p
3  5
2
:
LR =
Z B
0
L()d = 5  (3) 32 :
Given all these solutions in the rst stage, we can derive the optimal consumer surplus schedule of rm R.
Firm R o¤ers zero surplus to some of its consumers and then o¤ers positive surplus to those consumers who
are located closer to rm L. Hence, we need to derive the location of the marginal consumer of rm R who
obtains a positive surplus. This is given by the equating the surplus from outside opportunity (in this case
6
the surplus o¤ered by rm L) to zero.
0 = (1  M )qL(B)  pL(B)
= (1  M )(1  2B)  pL(B)
= (1  M )
h
1  2(2 
p
3)
i
 

 2(2 
p
3) + (2 
p
3)2  
p
3 +
5
2

;
) M =

1
2
p
3  3
p
3 

2 
p
3
2
  3
2

= 0:345:
Consequently, the total consumer surplus, welfare and prot of rm R are
sRR =
Z 0:34530
(2 p3)

(1  )  (1  2B)  ( 2B +B2  
p
3 +
5
2
)

d = 0:01 38:
wRR =
Z 1
B
wR()d =
5
6
p
3  1

2 
p
3

:
RR =
1
72

738
p
3  1263

:
1.3 Both Firms have PPQ
Proof of Proposition 3
In this case, both rms know exactly each consumers type. These two rms engage in a competition
similar to Bertrand competition. In equilibrium, both rms o¤er a socially optimal level of quality.
The rm located closer to a consumer will set the price such that the consumer surplus exactly matches
the highest possible consumer surplus o¤ered by the other rm. The rival rm sets price at marginal cost.
Neither rm will deviate by o¤ering a lower price to its rivalscustomers since no such action can bring in
additional prot. Hence, the prot functions of the rms are given as follows:
max
qL(); sL()
LBoth(); where 
L
Both() = (1  )qL()  sL() 
(qL) ()

; (17)
max
qR(); sR()
RBoth(); where 
R
Both() = q
R()  sR()  (q
R) ()

: (18)
Note that as before, rms still optimize with respect to both quality and surplus. Moreover, due to the perfect
targeting of consumers there are no self-selection problems, and thus there is no potential for cannibalization.
Hence, rms do not have to consider any IC constraints from the consumerspoint of view. Therefore, the
optimal quality schedules are determined by
@LBoth()
@qL()
= (1  )   qL 1 () = 0;
, qL() = (1  )1=( 1):
@RBoth()
@qR()
=     qR 1 () = 0;
, qR() = 1=( 1):
Both of these are the socially optimal quality schedules (rst-best solutions).
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Given the nature of the price competition between the two rms, we can determine sL(); sR() and hence
demonstrate the optimal price schedules. When  2 [1=2; 1]; consumers buy from rm R in equilibrium. At
the same time, the equilibrium price from rm L is equal to its marginal cost, (q
L)()
 , because of Bertrand
price competition. The equilibrium price from rm R is set at a level so that consumers feel indi¤erent
between buying from rm R and rm L.
sR() = (1  )qL()  pL();
= (1  )(1  )1=( 1)   (q
L) ()

= (1  1

)(1  )=( 1):
Similarly, we can derive the consumer surplus function of rm L.This is given by
sL() = qR()  pR();
= (1  1

)=( 1):
The social welfare functions are given by
wL() = uL(q(); )  c(q())
= (1  )qL()  (q
L) ()

= (1  1

)(1  )=( 1);  2 [0; 1=2]:
wR() = uR(q(); )  c(q())
= qR()  (q
R) ()

= (1  1

)=( 1);  2 [1=2; 1]:
Since p() = u(q(); )  s(); the price charged by each rm is given by
pL() = (1  )=( 1)   (1  1

)=( 1);  2 [0; 1=2]; (19)
pR() = =( 1)   (1  1

)(1  )=( 1);  2 [1=2; 1]: (20)
1.3.1 Total welfare, surplus and prots
Next, we present the closed-form solutions for the total welfare, surplus and prots. Since rms are sym-
metric, it is su¢ cient to present the results from rm L. The total welfare in this case is given by
wLBoth =
Z 1=2
0
[(1  1

)(1  )=( 1)]d
=
(  1)2
(2  1)(1  2
 (2 1)=( 1)).
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The total consumer surplus is given by
sLBoth =
Z 1=2
0

(1  1

)=( 1)

d
=
(  1)2
(2  1)  2
 (2 1)=( 1).
The total prot is given by
LBoth = w
L
Both   sLBoth
=
(  1)2
(2  1)(1  2
 =( 1)):
Proof of Corollary 1
First, by comparing the prices of rm L in the No-PPQ and Both-PPQ cases from equations (12) and
(19), we can show the di¤erence when  = 2 is given by the following equation:
(1  2)
 2 + 3
4

 

(1  )2   1
2
2

=
1
4
 
22   1 < 0: 8 2 [0; 1
2
]
Similarly, we can show that the price of rm R in the Both-PPQ case is higher than that in the No-PPQ
case.
For the case when  = 2; and rm R has PPQ, the price function of rm L is given by
pLR() = 
2   2  
p
3 +
5
2
;  2 [0; 2 
p
3]: (21)
The price of rm L in the No-PPQ case is given by
(1  2)
 2 + 3
4

(22)
Comparing these two equations, we have
2   2  
p
3 +
5
2

  (1  2)
 2 + 3
4

=
7
4
 
p
3 = 0:0179:
The last part of this corollary states that in the case when only rm R has PPQ, some consumers in Ls
market segment may receive lower prices from R. We can verify this by looking at the price of the marginal
consumer located very close to  = 2 p3: This is given by
pRR() = 
2  max (0; 3 + 5
p
3  2
p
3  17
2
);
=) pRR(2 
p
3) = 0:0359 < pLN (2 
p
3) = 0:286:
Proof of Proposition 4
We rst show that the surplus is lowest at  = 1=2 in the No-PPQ case.
dsL()
d
=
d
d

  1
2
(1  2)=( 1)

=  (1  2)1=( 1) < 0;8 2 [0; 1
2
):
dsR()
d
=
d
d

  1
2
(2   1)=( 1)

= (2   1)1=( 1) > 0;8 2 (1
2
; 1]:
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Next, we show that the surplus is highest at  = 1=2 in the Both-PPQ case.
dsL()
d
=
d
d

(1  1

)=( 1)

= 1=( 1) > 0;8 2 [0; 1
2
): (23)
dsR()
d
=
d
d

(1  1

)(1  )=( 1)

=  (1  )1=( 1) < 0;8 2 (1
2
; 1]: (24)
Lastly, we derive the regions in which the consumer surplus from buying from rm L is higher in the No-PPQ
case than that in the Both-PPQ case.
  1
2
(1  2)=( 1)  (1  1

)=( 1)
,   1
2 + 2( 1)=
;8  2 [0; 1
2
):
As a result, the value of b in the main text is 1
2+2( 1)= : Similarly, by symmetry, we can show that when
  b; the consumer surplus from buying from rm R is higher in the No-PPQ case than that in the
Both-PPQ case.
Proof of Corollary 2
We dene welfare of a consumer as the sum of the rms prot from that consumer and the surplus
accruing to that consumer. First note that when only one rm has PPQ, there are three regions in the
market which we need to consider in order to derive the stated result. In the rst region where  2 [0; B]; the
welfare generated from rm L is the same as that in the NoPPQ case. This is because the quality schedule
of the rm L (the NoPPQ rm) remains the same in each case. The second region under consideration
extends from  2 [B; 12 ]. We analyze the welfare in this region at the end. In the third region where  2 [ 12 ; 1];
the welfare generated by rm R is higher in this case compared to the NoPPQ case. This is because these
consumers are located closer to R and get the socially optimal quality from rm R. Given these results, it
is su¢ cient for us to compare the welfare in the second region. When  = 2; the corresponding expressions
for rm L and for rm R, respectively are given by:
wLN () = (1  )(1  2) 
1
2
(1  2)2;  2 [B; 1
2
];
wRR() =     
1
2
2;  2 [B; 1
2
]:
Recall that B = 2  p3: If we compare the welfare of the marginal consumer in the case when only R has
PPQ, we can nd that the welfare of this consumer is lower than what (s)he gets in the No-PPQ case as
given by the following equation:

wLN ()  wRR()
 j=B =  1
2
 
2 + 2   1 j=2 p3 = 0:196:
The proof of the Part (ii) of the result that each consumer in the Both-PPQ case has the highest welfare
is immediate because the quality is the rst-best solution and each consumer buys from the rm situated
closer to him. This proves the corollary.
Proof of Proposition 5
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It is su¢ cient to compare the prots in the case in which both rms adopt PPQ with that when neither
rm adopts PPQ. The prot in the No-PPQ case is given by
LN =
Z B
0

(1  2)qL()  (q
L) ()

  sL(B)

d
=
Z 1=2
0
[(1  2)1=( 1)

2 +   1
2

]d (25)
=
(  1)2
2(2  1) : (26)
The prot in the Both-PPQ case is given by
LBoth =
Z 1=2
0

(1  )qL()  sL()  (q
L) ()


d
=
Z 1=2
0
[(1  1

)((1  )=( 1)   =( 1))]d (27)
= (2  2 1  1 ) (  1)
2
2(2  1) : (28)
Since the rst term in (28) is greater than one for all  > 1; we nd that (28) is always greater than (26).
Thus, the prot of the Both-PPQ case is always higher.
Proof of Lemma 2
In the following paragraphs, we solve for the optimal quality schedules and the location of the marginal
consumer in each case. For the quality schedule of the PPQ rm, all of the results in the Both-PPQ case
still apply because the two rms compete for each individual consumer (each ): Hence, the results do not
depend on the distribution and range of :
 Determining B1(No-PPQ Case)
First, note that the proof of ds
R()
d = q
R () and ds
L()
d =  qL() in Lemma 1 still applies because the
proof does not depend on the value of the upper bound, r. Consider rst the objective function of rm R.
This is given by
max
qR(); sR(B1)
RN where 
R
N =
Z r
B1
"
qR()  (q
R) ()

  sR(B1) 
Z 
B1
qR(t)dt
#
d:
The last term in the integrand can be simplied as follows:Z r
B1
"Z 
B1
qR(t)dt
#
d =
Z r
B1
Z r
t
qR(t)d

dt =
Z r
B1
qR(t)(r   t)dt =
Z r
B1
qR()(r   )dt:
Note that the only di¤erence between this case and our benchmark symmetric No-PPQ case is that the
upper bound of integral here is r rather than 1. Substituting this term back in the objective function, we
have
RN =
Z r
B1

qR()  (q
R) ()

  sR(B1)  qR()(r   )

d;
=
Z r
B1

(2   r)qR()  sR(B1)  (q
R) ()


d:
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The objective function of rm L is the same as that in the benchmark case and can be rewritten as
max
qL(); sL(B1)
LN where 
L
N =
Z B1
0

(1  2)qL()  sL(B1)  (q
L) ()


d:
The optimal quality schedule can be determined by maximizing the integrand pointwise (the terms in the
bracket). The results are listed in Lemma 2.
Di¤erentiating the objective function of rm R with respect to sR(B1); we haveZ r
B1
 1  d  

(2B1   r)qR(B1)  sR(B1)  (q
R) (B1)


dB1
dsR(B1)
= 0: (29)
As before, dB1
dsR(B1)
can be derived by equating the consumer surplus from two rms o¤ered at the boundary
to the marginal consumer.
dB1
dsR(B1)
=
1
 qL () :
Substituting this back into (29), we have
(B1   r) 

(2B1   r)qR(B1)  (q
R) (B1)

  sR(B1)

1
 qL (B1) = 0: (30)
This implies that
sR(B1) = q
L (B1) (B1   r) +

(2B1   r)qR(B1)  (q
R) (B1)


: (31)
Similarly, we can derive a necessary condition of rm L which is given by
 B1 +

(1  2B1)qL(B1)  (q
L) (B1)

  sL(B1)

1
qR (B1)
= 0: (32)
This implies that
sL(B1) =  qR (B1)B1 +

(1  2B1)qL(B1)  (q
L) (B1)


: (33)
Since sR(B1) = sL(B1); we can equate (31) and (33) to derive the following equation.
qL (B1) (B1   r) +

(2B1   r)qR(B1)  (q
R) (B1)


=  B1qR (B1) +

(1  2B1)qL(B1)  (q
L) (B1)


:
Rearranging the terms and substituting qL (B1) = 1  2B1 and qR(B1) = 2B1   r; we have
(3B1   r)qR(B1)  (q
R) (B1)


=

(1  3B1 + r)qL(B1)  (q
L) (B1)


;
,

(3B1   r)(2B1   r)  (2B1   r)



=

(1  3B1 + r)(1  2B1)  (1  2B1)



;
, [(3B1   r)(2B1   r)  (2B1   r)] = [(1  3B1 + r)(1  2B1)  (1  2B1)] : (34)
B1 is the solution that satises this equation. A closed-form solution of the general case is not tractable.
However, it is can be derived numerically for specic values of .
 Determining B2(Only Firm R PPQ Case)
12
In this case, the procedure to derive B2 is similar to that for deriving B1 except that rm Rs quality
schedule is now di¤erent. From (33), from rm Ls perspective, sL(B2) is given by
sL(B2) =  qR (B2) (B2) +

(1  2B2)qL(B2)  (q
L) (B2)


: (35)
sR(B2) is determined by the socially optimal surplus function of buying from rm R. Since
sL(B2) = s
R(B2);
() sL(B2) = max
qR(B2)
B2 q
R(B2)  (q
R) (B2)

;
() sL(B2) = (1  1

)B
=( 1)
2 : (36)
Intuitively if sL(B2) < (1   1 )B=( 1)2 ; because of rm Rs ability to target consumers, the marginal
consumer at B2 will end up buying from rm R. Hence, for all consumers of rm L, sL(B2) must be greater
than (1  1 )B=( 1)2 . The marginal consumer is determined by equating the two surplus functions. From
equations (35) and (36), we have
 B2  qR (B2) +

(1  2B2)qL(B2)  (q
L) (B2)


= (1  1

)B
=( 1)
2 :
Substituting qL (B2) by (1  2B2)1=( 1) and qR (B2) by B1=( 1)2 ; we have
 B2 B1=( 1)2 +

(1  2B2)=( 1)   (1  2B2)
=( 1)


= (1  1

)B
=( 1)
2 ;
which on further simplication can be written as
(1  1

)(1  2B2)=( 1) = (2  1

)B
=( 1)
2 ;
, 1  2B2
B2
=

2  1
  1
( 1)=
;
, B2 =
"
2 +

2  1
  1
( 1)=# 1
: (37)
 Determining B3 (Only Firm L PPQ Case)
Similar to the procedure of determining B2, rm Rs consumer surplus at B3 is derived by (31) and given
as
sR(B3) = q
L (B3) (B3   r) +

(2B3   r)qR(B3)  (q
R) (B3)


:
Since rm L has PPQ, the optimal quality schedule is given by
qL (B3) = (1 B3)1=( 1):
Hence, the socially optimal consumer surplus curve of rm L at B3 is given by
sL (B3) = (1  1

)(1 B3)=( 1):
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Since sR(B3) = sL (B3) ; we have
(B3   r)qL (B3) +

(2B3   r)qR(B3)  (q
R) (B3)


= (1  1

)(1 B3)=( 1):
After substituting qL (B3) by (1 B3)1=( 1) and qR (B3) by (2B3   r)1=( 1); this equation can be written
as
(B3   r)(1 B3)1=( 1) + (1  1

)(2B3   r)=( 1) = (1  1

)(1 B3)=( 1): (38)
B3 is the solution that satises this equation but the closed-form solution of B3 is intractable. However, for
any given value of  and r; B3 can be solved for numerically.
 Determining B4 (Both PPQ Case)
Both rms compete at the individual consumers level. In mathematical terms, they maximize their
objective function as if  is given. Hence, the solutions do not depend on the distribution of  at all. As a
result, it is immediate that B4 = 1=2 just as we have in the baseline case.
1.4 Specic example ( = 2)
For illustrative purposes we solve the cases when the cost function is quadratic.
Case 1: B1:
When  = 2; equation (34) can be further simplied as
2(3B1   r)(2B1   r)  (2B1   r)2

=

2(1  3B1 + r)(1  2B1)  (1  2B1)2

;
,  2(3B1   r)(2B1   r)  (2B1   r)2   2(1  3B1 + r)(1  2B1)  (1  2B1)2 = 0;
,  2r   6B1 + 2rB1   r2 + 1 = 0;
, B1 = 2r   r
2 + 1
6  2r : (39)
Case 2: B2:
Equation (37) can be further simplied as
B2 = 1=
h
2 + (3)
1=2
i
= 2 
p
3:
Case 3: B3:
When  = 2; equation (38) is equivalent to
(B3   r)(1 B3) + 1
2
(2B3   r)2 = 1
2
(1 B3)2:
The solution of this equation is given by B3 = r +
p
5  2r   2:
When r = 1, B3 =
p
3  1: Comparing this to the solution of B2; by the symmetry of the game we must
have
B3 = 1 B2;
,
p
3  1 = 1 

2 
p
3

;
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which veries our derivations.
Proof of Proposition 6
The proof of Proposition 6 follows directly from the results of Lemma 2, by comparing the di¤erent
quality schedules. We only need to show that
(1  )1=( 1)  (1  2)1=( 1)
, (1  )  (1  2),   0:
Further, we need to show that
1=( 1)  (2   r)1=( 1)
,   (2   r), r  :
The last equality is true because  is uniformly distributed between [0; r]:
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